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What is an appropriate approach to African party politics? How can we better explain party success in order to counterbalance the weaknesses of macrostructural ethnoregionalism?
The article proposes to draw on actor-oriented approaches to party politics such as electoral clientelism (Weingrod 1968 , Lemarchand 1972 , Barkan and Okumu 1978 , Wantchékon 2003 , the personalization of parties (Sandbrook 1996 , Monga 1999 , Chabal and Daloz 1999 , Manning 2005 , and rational behavioralism (Strøm 1990, Harmel and Janda 1994) . The idea here is that the strategic exploitation of personal proximity between voters and politicians in rural Africa is of supreme importance. This implies the need for an approach which links candidates' individual features with a more "micro" perspective on the geographic space of operation. The hypothesis reads that strong incentives push political party elites in Africa towards selective local mobilization in order to successfully attain assembly seats-or even executive office. The most resource-efficient way to do so is by concentrating activities on particular geographic units. Regional concentration is, thus, not necessarily a sign of ethnoregional interest promotion, but rather of rational success maximization by goal-seeking parties (cf. Strøm 1990) . The use of ethnic appeal on the microsocial level expresses, thus, more of a strategic elite decision than a sociostructural automatism.
Research on the ethnic character of African party systems is inspired by macrosociological cleavage theory on voting behavior (Lipset and Rokkan 1967b) . The affiliation to one social group is connected to a preference for one particular party. This implies a certain stability and automatism between the macrosociological structure of societies (e.g., ethnic demography) and the emergence of parties which, presumably, defend the interests of their social groups, even though scholars would rarely claim a one-to-one translation of social structures into the political party system. Most often, structural approaches assume that ethnic groups mainly settle in one geographic region and that ethnoregional belonging determines support for political parties. While some countries seem to confirm this approach, in a number of African countries macrostructural approaches cannot sufficiently explain voting behavior. In some countries, empirical findings demonstrate that, first, region and ethnic affiliation are not congruent and, second, voting intentions are better explained by regional residence than ethnic self-ascription. Thus, geographic proximity also appears to be a crucial determinant of voting behavior. However, this article will argue that geographic regions as defined in most studies depict overly large entities. Or, conversely, proximity matters on a more local level. Ethnicity cannot be abandoned as a political factor in Africa. But given the structurally heterogeneous voting behavior which we measure in some states, such as Burkina Faso, we need to ask what exactly the mechanism is which makes ethnic appeal relevant for voting behavior.
Hence, I propose an approach which focuses on the strategic microbehavior of African parties. It concentrates on the proximity of candidates to their voters. Empirical evidence from Burkina Faso, where cleavage theory cannot explain apparently unsystematic voting patterns, supports the utility of this approach. The paper proceeds in four sections. Firstly, the discussion of three common approaches (macrostructuralism, electoral clientelism, behavioralism) leads to the development of a fourth, microbehavioral, approach. Subsequently, a four-stage analytical framework operationalizes the theoretical idea of this last approach. Thirdly, the selection of Burkina Faso as an adequate case study is justified, before empirical evidence from the Burkinabè example is used to test the utility of the approach. The utility test, which consists of a multistep analysis, is based on a comparison of detailed election data and information on the behavior and features of party leaders. The article concludes, fourthly, with comments on the generalizability of the findings and some theoretical implications.
Four Approaches

Macrostructuralism and Ethnoregional Cleavages
Political scientists and the general public commonly approach the success of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa using sociostructural explanations. Besides the structuralist view which is discussed in this subsection, there are at least two other mainstream approaches which are relevant in the African context. These focus less on greater social structures than on the relationships and behavior of individuals. They are discussed in the following subsections and finally consolidated into a fourth approach. This last model is subsequently applied to the case of Burkina Faso.
The central idea of a macrostructuralist approach is that voters gather in common macrosociological groups which are structured by social cleavages. According to the classical cleavage theory, these historically grown structures of society determine voting behavior. Due to the socioeconomic development and religious history of African societies, European cleavages such as "workers vs. employers/owners" or "church(es) vs. government" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967a: 14f) cannot contribute significantly to the explanation of voting preferences across Africa. Early perceptions of post-colonial Africa influenced the analysis of multiparty competition in African societies for a long period of time, leading to an emphasis on "ethnoregional" cleavages instead (Erdmann and Weiland 2001) . Mainly based on crucial examples of ethnic parties-sometimes explicitly referring to their ethnic basis 4 -and ventures of ethnoregional separatism, as in Biafra and Katanga, influential contributions stress the dangers of "tribalism," articulated in multiparty elections as a result of ethnic cleavages (Emerson 1966 , Wallerstein 1967 ).
The ethnoregional approach to African party politics is therefore a subset of cleavage theory, (Horowitz 1985 , Calhoun 1993 . Ethnic groups living predominantly in particular regions have continuously been promulgated as a typical determinant of African party systems (Widner 1997 , van de Walle and Butler 1999 , Ottaway 1999 , Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005 On the one hand, sub-Saharan populations today are often ethnically mixed. Incomplete, old databases impede systematic control. 5 Regional election data, which are often employed for relevant studies (e.g., Crook 1997 , Scarritt 2006 , Elischer 2008 , cannot prove the congruence of ethnic population shares (as far as they are available) or assumed ethnic majorities (which is rather the rule) with voting behavior. But recent empirical findings based on national survey polls confirm the incongruence of regional residence and ethnic affiliation and give rise to doubts about the general importance of ethnic affiliation for party support (Lindberg and Morrison 2008 , Erdmann 2007a , Basedau and Stroh 2008a , McLaughlin 2007 . Nobody would deny some degree of geographic concentration of members of ethnic groups within ethnically heterogeneous countries. However, this often occurs at a level lower than that of politically relevant geographic units. In other words, while ethnic homogeneity in a particular village can be the rule, it may be the exception at the level of electoral constituencies. Moreover, subnational administrative units are often better predictors of voting intentions than ethnic affiliations (Basedau and Stroh 2008a) . Thus, many Africans tend to align with their local neighbors rather than with their fellow "tribesmen" in other parts of the country. Nonethnic regional cleavages are usually difficult to justify theoretically, particularly if there is no obvious divide such as, for instance, the north/south rivalry in West Africa's coastal states.
On the other hand, ethnic or regionalist parties are legally banned in most African countries in order to avoid ethnic conflicts (Becher and Basedau 2008 ). Thus we cannot expect parties to openly conduct their electoral campaigns on the basis of ethnoregional interests, either because the elites who established the relevant rules really value the prohibition of ethnic campaigning or because they conceal it. 6 Both problems suggest the necessity of a search for alternative explanations.
5
The lack of data is often a consequence of a deliberate political decision. Many African countries avoid statistics on ethnic affiliations due to the risk of conflict presumably related to the topic.
6
Systematic studies on actual campaigning methods are very rare. One exception is Mayrargue's study exploring the electoral rhetoric in the case of Benin (Mayrargue 2004 ).
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Microsociological Alignment and Electoral Clientelism
A second approach is based on a microsociological phenomenon: clientelism. Lemarchand distinguishes clientelism from ethnicity by describing the first as a (microsociological) individual linkage and ethnicity as a (macrosociological) group phenomenon (Lemarchand 1972: 83) . This distinction is only loosely connected to the microsociological approach in Western party research, also known as the Columbia School, which argues that a person's social characteristics determine his or her political preference (Lazarsfeld et al. 1968: 27) . Individual ethnic identities-which are subject to ascription and change (Lemarchand 1972 : 69, Lentz 1995 -are one possible feature in this sense. However, a simplistic nexus between ethnic affiliation and party preferences has already been rejected, regardless of whether it is micro-or macrosociologically justified.
Instead of being a one-sided examination of voters, electoral clientelism is a theory of networking and individual dependencies. Clientelism establishes a mutual commitment between two individuals. Scholars thus emphasized this feature when they conceptualized the ideal-typical "big man" (Mines and Gourishankar 1990 , Médard 1992 , Bratton and van de Walle 1997 , Weingrod 1968 . The motivations which produce this special dyadic relationship between patrons and clients can build on various incentives. Some scholars emphasize the continuous and asymmetric dependency which favors the patron (Rouquié 1978) . Others promote the idea of a basically voluntary relationship (Spittler 1977) . The more elections become competitive, the more relevance voluntariness gains in electoral clientelism, since the voter has the opportunity to change his patron at the ballot box (cf.
Barkan and Okumu 1978).
Only if clientelistic relations become communal-in other words, a reciprocal relationship between a committing person and a specific group (of voters)-do Erdmann and Engel call it "patronage" (Erdmann and Engel 2007) . 7 Consequently, participation in patronage networks may be very rational in the eyes of a voter who has mainly parochial material interests due to his personal limits in time, space, and imagination. This voter would evaluate the candidate's political potency by weighing his earlier performance (especially direct material service delivery) and his capability to put pressure on higher political levels to support the local sphere. Since information is usually incomplete, rational evaluation may be supplemented by factors such as trust in a person who is socially close to the group to which the voter himself belongs (Erdmann and Engel 2007: 107) .
In a less systematic understanding of patronage, political parties are seen as mere power vehicles for individual members of the elite (Monga 1999 , Manning 2005 , Sandbrook 1996 , Randall 2005 or simply "extensions of individual politicians" (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 151) .
This concept of political parties implies similar relations of politicians to the electorate: clien-7 I prefer their differentiation to other definitions of the term which emphasize an exploitation of state resources in defining patronage (Warner 1997 ).
telism and electoral corruption (direct material benefits, vote buying) are widely interwoven. However, this approach does not sufficiently clarify the durability of the connection (Beck 2008: 3-11) .
In contrast to macrostructural approaches, these microsociological approaches, which use the paradigm of clientelism, conceive of sociological group identities such as ethnic affilia- 
Behavioralism and Party Organizations
The modern behavioralist theory of party success takes the existence of collective actors for granted. Accordingly, political parties are expected to develop rational strategies: they evaluate and concentrate their powers in order to achieve particular goals. The canon of goals includes policies, offices, and votes (Strøm 1990, Harmel and Janda 1994) . This ap-proach is theoretically very compatible with concepts of ethnoregionalism as well as clientelism. If the main objective of a party is the promotion of the interests of one ethnic group or an exclusive ethnic alliance, we are dealing with a primarily policy-seeking party. The preferred policy is namely one of ethnic privilege. According to an electoral clientelism approach, parties are mainly office-seeking. 8 Office and seats promise access to resources which voters (clients) expect will be redistributed individually.
The behavioralist theory emphasizes the rationality of collective action in order to attain the respective goal. The focus on organizations certainly risks underestimating the relative weakness of political parties and the power of individual linkages in African contexts. However, it brings organizations back into the analysis and suggests the need for a closer examination of party strategies. So, how do parties deal with the structural conditions they face?
Moreover, the focus on organizations on the supply side of elections (political parties) distinguishes this rational approach from rational choice models outlining the voting decisions of individual voters. The basic idea of political economists such as Downs and Key is that "voters are no fools" and that they therefore evaluate which political competitor best corresponds to their own interests (Downs 1957 , Key 1966 . Almost needless to say, this general assumption is easily acceptable with regard to the demand side (voters), though within some structural boundaries (e.g., level of education and information). However, contrary to party behavioralism, it neglects the supply side. A voter cannot choose among options which have never been available. The political offering can be restricted due to a lack of freedom of competition or due to deliberate decisions of political competitors. The latter point is emphasized in the following, fourth approach.
Microbehavioral Strategies of Localization
This fourth approach attempts to consolidate the microsociological and behavioral approaches in order to supplement the macrostructural approach. Since it is obviously the supply side of sub-Saharan party politics which has been widely neglected in the past, this approach focuses on the options voters have rather than on the choices they make.
Since there is no adequate data on strategy-making procedures within African parties, we need to predict the most likely strategy. In other words, they are more inclined to rational behavior which follows parochial material interests instead of accentuating abstract ethnic affiliation (Bienen 1971 : 200, Bailey 1963 . Moreover, party candidates must possess the capacity to campaign in a very practical manner: they should speak one or more of the local languages.
Since there is virtually no systematic training for intra-national "alien" languages in most sub-Saharan countries, being a "son of the soil" significantly facilitates this task. The first lesson for political parties should thus be to run "fils du terroir" as their candidates in order to meet the parochial interests of the electorate.
Clientelism defines the requirements for an individual candidate; behavioralism then brings in the party organization. African parties have long been described as electoral machines (Bailey 1963 , Bienen 1971 ) which virtually disappear between elections (Fomunyoh 2001: 48) .
Seen in a positive way, this at least means that they appear as collective actors during electoral periods. However, due to their apparent and sometimes obvious weakness, a systematic analysis of their strategic behavior has not been seen as relevant. Behavioralist theory suggests classifying electoral machines as office-seeking parties which try to win assembly seats and offices through minimal efforts during election periods. Accordingly, the second lesson for political parties is that success largely depends on an efficient allocation of financial and human resources during election periods.
In consideration of these lessons, the most rational strategy for parties is one of localization based on a mixture of assessments of the chances to win seats, an efficient allocation of financial resources, and studiously fielded "fils du terroir." This contribution will concentrate on the aspect of personal proximity in order to test the overall utility of the approach. We will keep the other factors in mind and use them in the case of inconsistencies with regard to 9
Bako-Arifari, himself obviously a connoisseur of the art of localizing political competition, was elected to parliament in 2007. However, since he avoided systematic inquiry and international comparison, he blamed this mechanism for being at the root of the weakness of political parties in Benin instead of discussing its general effects on party competition in Africa.
the proximity feature. Many parties, for instance, are not capable of engaging in territorywide competition due to human and financial resource scarcity. Thus, they need to concentrate their activities on selected constituencies. 10 Besides the availability of "sons of the soil" (human resources), for instance, the amount of funds for travel expenses can influence a party's localization strategy. 11 Geographic concentration on particular regions or where there is good transport infrastructure avoids the inefficient use of financial resources.
Analytical Framework
How can we systematically test the utility of the microbehavioral approach? First of all, we need to detect the geographic positioning of party success and failure. Are there "regionalist" parties? Do parties concentrate on one particular region and willfully neglect others in order to represent (ethno)regional interests? Do parties follow a strategy of localization by seeking office in a resource-efficient way? How do they incorporate their human resources?
All these questions are addressed using a four step analytical framework which relies on disaggregated electoral results. The framework includes the development of some requirements which a suitable case for an exploratory utility test should meet.
First
Step: "Regionalization" or Uneven Distribution?
Jones and Mainwaring measure the "nationalization" of political parties (Jones and Mainwaring 2003) . In their understanding a "nationalized" party is a party with a support base which is equally distributed across the country. They imply that the opposite of their understanding of nationalization is "regionalization," 12 which appears to be a good proxy for comparing the overall level of regionalization of different parties. However, the actual opposite of the nationalization score is uneven distribution. The score neglects the geographic positions of electoral strongholds, whereas the term regionalization intuitively suggests the concentration of a party in one particular geographic region. A true regionalist party is not expected to possess strongholds in totally different corners of a given country, but to defend regional interests. This is why the distribution score must be supplemented with a mapping 10 A large majority of African electoral systems provide for single-member or small-sized constituencies (see Nohlen 2007) .
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A study of party financing practices recently showed that African party officials most often declare transportation as the single largest item in campaign expenditures (Bryan and Baer 2005: 15) . 12 Jones and Mainwaring calculate the Gini coefficient of votes in geographic regions, that is, the degree of unequal distribution of party support across a given country, in order to identify the nationwide rooting of parties (Jones and Mainwaring 2003 , for an application to an African case see Elischer 2008) . Since the coefficient varies between zero and one, with rising values indicating increasing inequality, they subtract it from one in order to reach a value of one indicating the highest degree of nationalization. I will simply use the Gini coefficient to measure "non-nationalization"; that is, the higher the Gini value, the higher the degree of uneven distribution of support across the country.
of strongholds. For this purpose, a stronghold is defined as a constituency (or relevant votecounting unit) where a party receives more than double its average vote share.
High distribution scores plus geographic concentration would indicate regionalist parties and therefore support the macrosociological approach. High scores plus geographic deconcentration would, in contrast, support the microbehavioral approach. High nationalization scores for all major parties would challenge both approaches. In order to make the distribution score more precise, a suitable test case should thus be one with geographically small electoral constituencies. Additionally, an ideal test case would be one in which ethnic groups are clearly geographically mixed in order not to confound ethnic affiliation with geographic residence.
Second Step: Refining Concentration Patterns with Local Electoral Data
With the help of electoral data from the communal level, the analysis should identify more confined strongholds, record their geographic distribution, and compare the results with the constituency level. While data from parliamentary elections serve best for the first step, this refinement procedure can employ locally disaggregated legislative results or data from municipal elections. 13 A concentration of local strongholds in specific regions where the regional support is generally above average would tend to support the macrosociological approach but not necessarily contradict the emphasis on proximity. An apparently unsystematic dispersion of local strongholds across the country would contradict macrosociological expectations and, thus, further strengthen the utility of a microbehavioral approach, while evenly distributed local support bases would challenge both approaches.
Third Step: Deliberate Electoral Participation and Nonparticipation of Parties
The assessment tools used in steps one and two are ex post evaluations of voting decisions.
Only by examining the pattern of geographic positioning are we able to come to any conclusions about parties' localization strategies. However, it is difficult to determine the precise degree of influence party action has on the vote, particularly without detailed data on the allocation of campaign resources (frequency and location of rallies and canvassing, expenditures for gadgets, etc.). The best alternative is to highlight electoral participation in the sense of the running of candidates. The data on where certain parties stand and do not stand for election is objective and officially available. Collective party action is assumed as long as a decision not to participate was taken deliberately. Given resource scarcity, the willful neglect of particular areas and a resource-efficient concentration of activities should lead to a
13
If employing municipal ballots, we should pay attention to significant deviations in turnouts in order to minimize the danger of incorrect conclusions from totally different electorates. However, a comparison with legislative results should help in avoiding this trap.
greater success ratio. The more precisely localities appear to be selected, the more the findings support the microbehavioral approach. On the contrary, ethnoregional parties should run their candidates across the main settlement area of their affiliated group without concern for the balance of success.
Accordingly, the third step evaluates the patterns of nonparticipation and their correlation with relative party success in those electoral districts where candidates have been nominated. A suitable test case should provide for the legal option of the selective running of candidates. That is, nominating candidates in several constituencies while not standing for election in several other constituencies must be allowed. Otherwise it would be necessary to attain a great deal of complex data on the scope and allocation of party resources; these are usually unavailable.
Fourth Step: Measuring a Strategy of Personal Proximity
Finally, we want to know more about the reasoning of parties. The previous steps can iden- The following scenario would again support the utility of the microbehavioral approach: A party is particularly successful where it manages to run important "sons of the soil," while it deliberately neglects competition or fails in other constituencies-independent of their geographic position or of similar ethnic structures. By recalling electoral clientelism, which serves as one influential starting point of this approach, we would expect that a candidate's relative importance in the political scene (level within hierarchy, office incumbency, access to resources, etc.) broadens his geographic range of appeal (cf. Barkan and Okumu 1978) . In other words, the higher a "fils du terroir" rises in the clientelist pyramid, the larger the geographic area he is able to cover. Accordingly, the quality of this step's results is highly dependent on the availability of very detailed data on individual politicians, such as information about their home districts, particular social roles, and public standing. However, the mathematically uneven distribution does not correspond to a geographic concentration of strongholds. Accordingly, we are not dealing with regionalization. I reiterate the definition of a stronghold: a district where the party wins at least double its average share of votes in all contested constituencies. According to this definition, the parties under review possess three to five provincial strongholds-except the CDP, which would need a 120 percent share in a given province to fulfill the criteria. By joining the high measure of nationalization (even distribution) with the general difficulty of identifying clear-cut strongholds, we can identify the dominant CDP as a true national party. This does not ignore the fact that the microbehavioral mechanism also works with CDP, but the secondary parties will be more helpful for the utility test.
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There are several possible explanations as to why the survey results differ to a certain degree from the 2007 election results. One is the strong effect of concentration of the Burkinabè electoral system used in 2007; a second is the short-term mobilization strategies which lower the predictive potential (which has never been a target) of chronologically distanced surveys; and a third might be a reluctance to vote even when citizens are clearly able to define their political will. If we estimate half of Burkina's national population to be of legal age, turnout in the May 2007 polls was about 30 percent, while freely uttered voting intentions were measured at 78.2 percent in the survey.
17
Burkina Faso has changed its electoral law at each election. Due to discontent from the opposition, the electoral law is again under discussion and will probably be amended before the next election in 2012. In sum, although abstract distribution scores indicate a low level of nationalization of party success, in political terms there is no systematic macroregional division of the national territory. However, parties do possess strongholds which appear to scatter unsystematically.
Second Step: Municipal Concentration
The territory of Burkina Faso is divided into 358 municipalities (districts or in French "communes"), each of them pooling several villages or urban quarters. The size of the council assemblies ranges from 16 to 226 seats, with an average size of 50 councilors. Councilors are elected in small village constituencies. However, the generally large assembly size creates realistic chances for smaller parties to win seats. In order to get even closer to the concept of office-seeking parties 18 and due to the large number of electoral units, this step uses seat shares instead of vote shares to define strongholds.
Again, CDP is not represented since its general dominance obstructs any meaningful identification of strongholds. The average CDP seat share is 74.3 percent and it achieves aboveaverage results across the entire country. Thus, a focus on secondary parties' strategies contributes much more to the utility test. Even at first glance, Table 1 So far, data from different geographic levels confirm the utility of going more local with the analysis, since party success is neither concentrated macroregionally nor evenly distributed in the sense of true national parties.
Step three must deepen the discussion on participation strategies in order to generate a better understanding of the persistence and dynamics of party success patterns.
Third Step: Patterns of Strategic Participation and Neglect
The approach implies that a party which is implementing a strategy of localization consciously chooses particularly promising localities for competition and willfully neglects others. Possibly, the most promising constituencies are situated within one larger region.
Still drawing on information from the previous step, we find that all selected parties are represented in councils across the country. There is no strong pattern of regionalization in Burkina Faso (again, see Table 1 and cf. Figure A1 Table 2 ). Hence, UPR employed the most concentrated strategy, but still dispersed competition and success to very different areas. Generally, we find 91 municipal strongholds of secondary parties in total. A large majority of strongholds (63 units or 69.2 percent) are situated in provinces where the respective party's average results in all remaining non-stronghold districts is below its national average. Hence, more than two-thirds of all strongholds are located in political environments of below-average performance.
The effect of the party's deliberate decisions becomes most visible in those 16 strongholds which are situated in provinces where the given party is (virtually) 20 nonexistent outside the stronghold district(s). To run there was a deliberate, and presumably strategic, choice by the respective parties, since they did not even present themselves in 69 out of 79 surrounding districts, that is, in other non-stronghold districts within the same province. Thus, we may call these 16 cases "island strongholds."
Indeed, we apparently are not dealing with geographic concentration in the sense of interest representation, but rather in the sense of a rational party strategy of office-seeking elites.
However, the visibility of this effect certainly decreases with the increasing nationalization of a party and with increasing resources. This is why this type of examination does not work with CDP (all districts contested) and remains less clear with ADF/RDA (78.2 percent of districts contested). Still, the analysis recognizes different concentration strategies between the parties, particularly between the three smaller secondary parties. UPR has only one island stronghold as it concentrated its energy on fewer provinces and, therefore, often established several strongholds in one province with above-average results in surrounding districts (see Table 1 ). However, the party is not macroregionally concentrated since the six provinces in which it won its 11 strongholds are distributed over five administrative re-
20
The limit is set at one local council seat won by the party in the same province but outside its stronghold(s). An important caveat should not be concealed: UPR belongs to the presidential movement and is thus close to the government. The work of opposition parties may be complicated and made more difficult due to the inchoate democratization of the political regime (see Stroh 2008) . However, even this should have an impact on relational voters with parochial interests who believe they will benefit more-in the short term-from closeness to government. This is, by the way, a plausible reason for the ongoing dominance of the presidential party CDP. However, the more nationalized ADF/RDA, which is even taking part in the cabinet, works significantly less efficiently. Interpreting UPR's performance advance as a result of strategic decisions ceteris paribus is therefore justified.
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Personal conversation with campaign managers at PDP/PS headquarters, Ouagadougou, May 2, 2007. In sum, there is further evidence for the utility of a microbehavioral approach, since a macroregional approach would lead to the expectation of a stronger homogeneity of regional-and, even more so, provincial-success patterns. However, the existence of island and non-island concentration of party performance already challenges structural ethnoregionalism. Still, without the theoretical underpinning which links the stronghold analysis to localized clientelism in the form of the "fils du terroir" leitmotiv, previous findings do not yet validate the approach's utility to a fully satisfactory extent.
Fourth Step: Benefits of "Fils du Terroir"
The article aims to test the utility of a microbehavioral approach as a complementary alternative to structural determination. The approach emphasizes the human resources of political parties. Without a doubt, other possible factors such as organizational failure (see PDP/ PS above), financial resources, or institutions may distort party decisions. Consequently, I
continue to concentrate on the four secondary parties, further excluding CDP as its extensive financial resources and political dominance obstruct adequate testing.
Following the logic of proximity, the most efficient option is for leading party personnel to campaign first and foremost within their home areas and to recruit capable candidates from
there. An analysis of candidates and campaigns in all strongholds could be one way into the examination of the strategy. "Island strongholds," for instance, should point to restricted resources that had to be further concentrated. This requires data from deeper field work on these particular districts which is not currently available in a comprehensive manner. We thus have to content ourselves with another access path which reverses the logic of examination and looks at the effects of party leaders on their home districts. Does their personal proximity to local voters make a significant difference to a party?
I identified the five to seven highest-ranking party officials 22 for a correlation of human resources and success balances. I then compared the individual places of origin (home districts) with the party's legislative and municipal strongholds. The leaders' origins provide an initial insight into the party's (non)interests: None of the leadership circles is exclusively composed of people from one specific region or ethnic group (cf . Table 3 ). Again, we find evidence which counters exclusive ethnoregionalism. However, the argument is that parties use candidates' local affiliation, which may include a strong ethnic factor due to communication needs (campaign language) and enhanced trust ("one of us"). The significant differences from an ethnoregional approach are exclusiveness, policy aims, and political scope.
Strict structuralism asks for an exclusive representation of macrosociological group interests.
A strategy of localization is only about proximity to the parochial voter. It includes the potential competition of candidates from various parties.
22
The number of officials depends on the internal structure of the respective party. Source: Author's compilation on the basis of field research, using data from CENI Burkina Faso. Some information has been completed with the help of Augustin Loada and Yacouba Banhoro, both from the University of Ouagadougou.
Now, to what extent is the microbehavioral application of the "fils du terroir" strategy traceable?
At the 2006 municipal polls, the selected parties won above-average seat shares 23 in roughly half of the home districts of their leading representatives. Nine out of 23 home districts became party strongholds, including the rural homes of three party presidents. 24 However, the parties failed to win seats in four home districts and three home districts were not contested.
The opposition party UNIR/MS accounts for the largest number of failures and cases of nonparticipation in leaders' home districts and their surroundings (a total of four). Party
23
That is, above the average seat share of all districts in which the party competed for seats.
24
In the case of ADF/RDA, party president Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo was born and lives in Ouagadougou, which is not a stronghold of his party. However, his family is originally from Ouahigouya in northern Yatenga Province. Gilbert's father, Gérard Kango Ouédraogo, who is the honorary president of the party and an ex-prime minister, still resides there. Therefore, this is commonly seen as his home district.
leaders explained to the author that they had to follow a strategy of concentration on the capital province Kadiogo, where most of the principal representatives live, and Passoré, which is the home province of the two highest-ranking party representatives, in both municipal and legislative elections due to resource scarcity. 25 Consequently, some of the leaders' home districts had to be neglected for the sake of resource efficiency. UNIR/MS opted for nonparticipation in the remote home districts of two national secretaries. On top of saving travel expenses, the decision was based on the fact that the respective provinces are reputed to be strongholds of competing parties. The nine municipalities of Comoé, for in- However, data on the intensity of party campaigns in those home districts, where they ultimately failed to win seats despite their high level of "fils du terroir," is not available. In other words, much more field research has to be done to determine whether parties strategically minimized their efforts or whether they were competitively defeated. It is also unknown why PDP/PS totally concentrated on far-off Pensa in Sanmatenga Province while leaving Boussouma uncontested to CDP although the party's honorary president, Théodore S. Ouédraogo, is the Naba Sonré, the traditional king of Boussouma. Again, research falls victim to data scarcity.
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The head of the ADF/RDA's parliamentary party, Sidiki Ou Belem, himself from the Sahel region, led the Yatenga list. However, the Yatenga Province is the home of ADF/RDA's "grey eminence" and honorary president, Gérard Kango Ouédraogo, who is the father of today's party president (cf. fn. 22). Being a minister, the latter, Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo, led the party's national list, leaving the Yatenga stronghold to Sidiki Ou In between, Traoré did leave the party. In sum, the findings support an approach which focuses on parties' rationalized strategies of localization, based on resource efficiency and personal proximity, in Burkina Faso. The choice of the districts where a party participates in the municipal polls thus appears to comply largely with a combination of four microbehavioral factors. First, a strategic confidence in the local spillover effects of honorable sons 30 on neighboring districts. Second, the efficient concentration of restricted resources in order to avoid greater geographic distances. Third, the efficient mobilization of candidates and party workers through existing local social networks, including ethnic and linguistic linkages. Fourth, the strategic neglect of particular home districts due to intervening factors. The more a party deliberately commits to following this rational logic, the better it performs at the polls.
5
Conclusion: Theoretical Implications
The deficiencies of macrosociological approaches to African party politics have necessitated research on alternative approaches. By adhering to the debate on personalization and clientelism on the one hand and to the rational decisions of collective actors on the other hand, this article has opted for a microbehavioral approach. A utility test using the example of Burkina Faso has supported a perspective on African party politics which emphasizes the rational decisions of party elites who follow a strategy of localized competition.
Burkinabè parties obviously have campaign strategies which are adapted to their human and financial resources. Their primary goal appears to be the maximization of chances to win seats. Borrowing a familiar term, we may characterize them as being mainly officeseeking parties. An important parameter for their strategy design is the "fils du terroir" principle, which builds upon personal proximity to voters with basically parochial material interests. A network of leading party officials (and presumably of other, less prominent "fils et filles du terroir") 31 concentrates on home districts and provinces. This is a pattern common to all parties under review and pays well, although to varying extents. Since the geographic distribution of strongholds is spread unsystematically across the country, it cannot be the result of ethnoregional structures, but, instead, of the localized advantages of party elite members. Consequently, geographic concentration or dispersion is the results of deliberate elite decisions rather than the predetermined results of social structures. They are, thus, mainly the results of a rational strategy of localization.
Though based on a certain range of plausible but not systematically tested assumptions, the empirical evidence of this article supports the utility of a microbehavioral approach and,
30
There are no women among the 23 selected officials.
31
Due to data and expenditure restrictions, I could not test the human resource background of all candidates. Incidentally, this could provide for a very good opportunity for fruitful interdisciplinary research including social anthropologists and political scientists.
therefore, has several theoretical implications. Considering the exemplary character of the selected case study, the following theses ought to be examined through further research.
First, the key mechanism of party politics in Africa might actually be rational decision making, which means the localized mobilization of people with parochial interests, and not so much the structural mobilization of exclusive ethnoregional identities. Ethnic mobilization happens, but only within a confined space. Ethnic affiliation to a candidate is often a resource-efficient and comparably simple means of mobilization. However, if all parties rely on this strategy in overlapping areas of competition, it is not sufficient in explaining success.
Second, decision makers at the top of the parties have the power to balance their organizations' human and financial resources against several national and local context variables such as local social demography, infrastructural accessibility, electoral institutions, advantages of incumbency, and the strongholds of other parties.
Third, cleavages and open conflicts between ethnic groups are, independent from their genesis, reduced to ex ante incentives for party elites who decide whether they concentrate their mobilization on exclusive ethnoregional identities or not. Since it is hard to imagine that discrete parochial interests pose a serious threat, the main responsibility lies in the hands of the elites.
Fourth, change becomes, ceteris paribus, more likely from a microbehavioral perspective than with socio-structural approaches which expect deeply rooted determinants of party politics.
In other words, the behavioral approach-being a top-down approach-affects fewer people and decisions, while the structural approach-being a bottom-up approach-implies slow and difficult opportunities for change.
Fifth, the more a party is centered around one individual "big man," the more it becomes likely that the party is regionally concentrated in his home region in order to control the network and protect his self-interest. Coalitions of several "big men" can obviously bridge the ethnoregional dimension and overlap geographically with other parties' zones of interest in an unsystematic manner due to opportunity structures. Finally, divergence in party behavior underlines the fact that we need to think of African party systems in a less onedimensional manner. Notes: Detailed geographical allocation: Municipalities of the administrative region Cascades on positions 1-17; Hauts Bassins, Boucle du Mouhoun, Nord, [198] [199] [200] [201] [202] [203] [204] [205] [206] [207] [208] [209] [210] [211] [212] [213] [214] [215] [216] Centre (Ouagadougou), [217] [218] [219] [220] [221] [222] [223] [224] [225] [226] [227] Plateau Central, [228] [229] [230] [231] [232] [233] [234] [235] [236] [237] [238] [239] [240] [241] [242] [243] [244] [245] [246] [247] Sahel, and Est, Source: Author's representation based on data from CENI Burkina Faso (independent electoral commission) 
Annex
